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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

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1. The Yugoslav Communist Party Central Committee decree to enlarge the Party membership should be implemented. The latter should be coupled with revival of an all-out Communistic educational program in order to prevent the watering down of the Yugoslav Communist Party with lukewarm adherents.
2. All Cominform accusations are to be denied although more of such are to be expected as a result of the trials in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. Crisis is seen slated for spring, against which Yugoslavia must prepare now. The Cominform is expected to proceed as follows:
  - a. Intense recriminations against Yugoslav leaders during the winter;
  - b.. Increase border incidents;
  - c. Infiltration of guerrilla organizers into Yugoslavia and increased guerrilla action;
  - d. Severance of all diplomatic relations by Cominform countries;
  - e. Armed attack by Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania in the spring. USSR expected to secretly control and coordinate satellite efforts. Satellites may be reinforced by "volunteer" international brigades of Poles, Czechs, Soviets and East Germans. The latter step is deemed necessary by Yugoslavs who feel they could rout four of the above-mentioned unreinforced attackers;
  - f. USSR to preserve fictitious neutrality to tie up Western Powers, at the same time defending satellite actions in the U.S.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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3. Tito and Party are resolved to fight. They will first defend the eastern borders and if driven back will take up guerrilla activity in the interior where underground installations are already being prepared. Such preparations have already been observed in Kocovski Rog (Slovenia) and Bosnia.
4. Tito is not counting on armed support from the West, although he expects support in arms equipment and stores, chiefly fuel, on a commercial basis. The present Western help is useful but without regard to Yugoslavia's real need.
5. The masses must continually be exhorted to rally to Tito against the criminal attacks of the Cominform. Also real efforts must be made to consolidate whatever friendship exists for Tito in Cominform countries, bringing malcontents into the Tito camp. Special emphasis must be placed on France, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.

6. The following views were expressed  25X1

- a. As a result of the anxiety of Tito and his supporters they are ready to make many concessions to the internal democratic development in order to win the sympathy of Western public opinion and more concrete aid from Western Governments. So far the West has asked for no such concessions. Tito feels therefore, that the West is ready to assure support to anyone who resists the USSR, regardless of its internal political system. He realizes the hostility of public opinion in the West to aid which has been given in the past.
- b. Tito's and the Yugoslav Communist Party's anxiety is mirrored in the following developments calculated to win over the Yugoslav masses:
  - (1) The release of many minor political offenders;
  - (2) Nationalization, forced labor and compulsory agricultural deliveries are no longer strictly enforced;
  - (3) The tax system is modified and administered less severely;
  - (4) Archbishop Stepinac has greater freedom and comfort. His release is being considered.

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